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ABSTRACT 
 
In the long history of psychological research on prejudice, Allport‟s (1954) book The 
Nature of Prejudice is undoubtedly the foundational work, advancing ideas that remain 
highly influential and relevant to date. Guided by the seminal ideas of this leading 
scholar, we illustrate how contemporary psychological research has accumulated 
evidence for a basic, motivated cognitive style underlying prejudice in its different forms. 
Specifically, we demonstrate that Allport‟s classic conception of this basic cognitive style 
is exceptionally well captured by the „modern‟ construct of need for cognitive closure 
(NFC), and we review the recent evidence for NFC effects on racism and sexism.  
Integrating Allport‟s writings with contemporary research, we also show that the effects 
of motivated cognition on prejudice are explained (i.e., mediated) by essentialist thinking 
and authoritarian ideology. Finally, we discuss recent evidence indicating that, in contrast 
to Allport‟s pessimistic predictions, intergroup contact is especially effective in reducing 
prejudice among people high in NFC. It is concluded that recent research on NFC 
provides a solid empirical basis for Allport‟s hypothesis that a general motivated 
cognitive style lies at the basis of prejudice. 
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The study of prejudice has been at the forefront of social psychological research 
for decades, as prejudice is an undeniable aspect of social relations and a lingering 
societal problem. Prejudice can target many groups based on ethnicity and race (racism), 
gender (sexism), or any other salient social category. However, Allport (1954) asserted 
that the specific targeted group is only of secondary importance in understanding the 
nature of prejudice. Instead, prejudice should be considered in terms of a general, 
motivated cognitive style. To put it in Allport‟s  (1954/1979) words: “A person‟s 
prejudice is unlikely to be merely a specific attitude to a specific group; it is more likely 
to be a reflection of his whole habit of thinking about the world” (p. 170), and “the style 
of thinking that is characteristic of prejudice is a reflection, by and large, of the 
prejudiced person‟s way of thinking about anything” (p. 400). Over the years, however, 
these seminal ideas have faded from the psychological research agenda, and the issue of a 
general motivated cognitive style underlying prejudice has only recently reemerged. 
 
NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE AS A CONTEMPORARY TRANSLATION OF 
ALLPORT‟S GENERAL MOTIVATED COGNITIVE STYLE. 
Four decades after Allport formulated his ideas, Kruglanski (1989; Kruglanski & 
Webster, 1996) developed the Need for Closure (NFC) theory as a framework for the 
cognitive-motivational aspects of human knowledge formation. Since its introduction, 
NFC theory has taken a prominent place in social psychological research on human 
decision-making and judgment. The need for cognitive closure has been defined as the 
desire for “an answer on a given topic, any answer … compared to confusion and 
ambiguity” (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1049) and is assumed to instill two 
tendencies when people make judgments and construct knowledge. The urgency 
tendency refers to the desire for quick and definite answers, resulting in the inclination to 
seize easily accessible information. The permanence tendency refers to perseverance or 
freezing the obtained answer and hence protecting the acquired knowledge against 
contradictory information. 
Kruglanski and Webster (1996) demonstrated that although NFC can be 
temporarily heightened by situational forces such as time pressure and noise, it is also an 
individual trait variable, as people substantially differ in their overall level of NFC. To 
measure individual differences in dispositional NFC, Webster and Kruglanski (1994) 
developed the NFC scale, composed of five facet scales: Individuals high in dispositional 
NFC prefer order and structure in their lives as well as predictability, reflected in a desire 
for secure and stable knowledge that is reliable across circumstances and unchallenged by 
exceptions. High NFC individuals also experience an urgent desire to reach swift and 
firm decisions, reflected in their need for decisiveness, and they feel discomfort with 
ambiguity, experiencing situations lacking closure as aversive. Finally, they are closed-
minded, reflected by the unwillingness to have their knowledge challenged. 
Most remarkably, although Kruglanski‟s theory originates from a research 
tradition outside of the prejudice literature, NFC shows a striking similarity to the 
prejudice-prone cognitive style proposed by Allport. Indeed, as illustrated in Table 1, the 
concepts used in NFC theory have been almost literally described by Allport, and the 
close fit between these „new concepts‟ and „old ideas‟ clearly illustrates that both theories 
refer to the same motivated way of thinking.  
 
 Prejudice-prone motivated cognitive style 
(Allport) 
 Need for closure 
(Kruglanski) 
  Two underlying tendencies 
“Urge for quick and definite answers” (p. 
403). 
 Urgency tendency (seizing) 
“Cling to past solutions… more given to 
perseveration” (p. 402). 
 Permanence tendency (freezing) 
 
 NFC subscales 
“Like order, especially social order” (p. 404). 
 
 Preference for Order  
    (e.g., “I like to have a place for everything and 
     everything in its place”) 
“Feel more secure when they know the 
answers” (p. 402) and “Latch onto what is 
familiar” (p. 403). 
 Preference for Predictability 
    (e.g., “I don‟t like to go into a situation without 
     knowing what I can expect”) 
“Afraid to say „I don‟t know‟” (p. 402) and 
“Better not to hesitate” (p. 403). 
 Need for Decisiveness 
    (e.g., “When I‟m confronted with a problem, 
     I‟m dying to reach a solution very quickly”) 
“Cannot tolerate ambiguity” (p. 175, see also 
p. 401). 
 Discomfort with Ambiguity  
    (e.g., “I dislike it when a person‟s statement could 
     mean many different things”) 
“Narrow-minded” and “Fail to see all relevant 
sides to his problem” (p. 402). 
 Closed-Mindedness 
    (e.g., “I do not usually consult many different 
     opinions before forming my own view”) 
Note: Sample items of the NFC scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) in parentheses. 
Items from the (Need for) Decisiveness facet have been revised by Roets and Van Hiel 
(2007). 
 
NEED FOR CLOSURE AND PREJUDICE 
Given this extraordinary conceptual fit, NFC seems to be a perfect contemporary 
operationalization of Allport‟s general cognitive style. However, does NFC also underlie 
Table 1. Fit between Allport‟s motivated cognitive style and Need for Closure 
(all) prejudice? In recent years, a number of studies have revealed that dispositional NFC 
is strongly related to various measures of blatant, subtle, and modern forms of racial 
prejudice (e.g., Onraet, Van Hiel, Roets & Cornelis, 2011; Roets & Van Hiel, 2006, 
2011; Van Hiel, Pandelaere & Duriez, 2004) and even to implicit measures of racism 
(Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004). However, for the NFC concept to truly compare 
to Allport‟s idea of a general way of thinking underlying „all‟ prejudice, its effects should 
also be evident for other forms of prejudice. In line with this idea, Roets, Van Hiel and 
Dhont (in press) found strong relationships between NFC and sexism toward both women 
and men among both male and female participants, demonstrating that NFC strongly 
relates to all gender-based prejudices. Most importantly, their finding that, for example, 
high levels of NFC in women leads not only to more prejudice toward men but also to 
more prejudice toward women (i.e., the own ingroup) further substantiates Allport‟s 
(1954) assertion that prejudice is the reflection of a general cognitive style that does not 
„discriminate‟ between targeted groups. 
Yet, how exactly does NFC lead to prejudice? The key to answering this question 
is in the way that high-NFC individuals seek to satisfy their need for quick, easy, firm, 
and stable knowledge about the world. That is, to meet their desire for closure in the 
social environment, people typically resort to essentialist categorization and authoritarian 
ideologies, which represent some of the most powerful, proximal determinants of 
stereotyping and prejudice (see Figure 1). 
  
 
 
ESSENTIALIST SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION 
According to Allport, “Categorical thinking is a natural and inevitable tendency of 
the human mind” (p. 171). Indeed, social categorization allows people to construct and 
organize knowledge about the social world and to cope with its complexity. However, 
social categories are more than just cognitive constructions. Allport suggested that 
categorization may lead to a “belief in essence” (p. 174): the conviction that a category 
has meaningful, defining attributes that are shared by all its members. Such essentialist 
thinking, he argued, is the primary cognitive process that leads to prejudice. Remarkably, 
it was not until Medin reintroduced the concept of psychological essentialism in 1989 
that (social) psychologists thoroughly addressed essentialism as an important source of 
prejudice. Since then, numerous studies have corroborated its detrimental impact on 
various forms of prejudice (e.g., Haslam & Levy, 2006; Haslam, Rothschild & Ernst, 
2002).  
Most importantly, Allport suggested that the belief in essence is a likely 
consequence of the motivated cognitive style he described. Indeed, the allocation of 
individuals to a limited set of meaningful social categories is very useful for making 
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Figure 1: Allport‟s Prejudiced Personality in contemporary terms: General model of the effects 
of Need for Closure as a general motivated cognitive style on various forms of prejudice 
through intermediate processes of essentialist thinking and authoritarian ideology.  
quick, easy and stable inferences about these individuals. As could be expected based on 
Allport‟s proposition, NFC has been reported to increase the perception of target groups 
as homogeneous (Dijksterhuis, Van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996) and to 
increase reliance on group membership information when making social judgments about 
individuals (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1988).  
In a series of recent studies, Roets and Van Hiel (2011) explicitly tested the 
relationship between dispositional NFC and essentialist beliefs about race, revealing 
strong correlations (up to r = .50).
2
 Additionally, they demonstrated that experimentally 
induced NFC caused an increase in essentialist thinking, even for fictitious ethnic groups 
(see Figure 2). This finding provides direct evidence for the causal role of NFC on 
essentialist thinking. Moreover, Roets and Van Hiel (2011) revealed that approximately 
half of the effect of NFC on various forms of racism could be explained by increased 
levels of essentialist thinking. In sum, this work provides strong support for Allport‟s 
thesis that a general way of thinking leads to prejudice through the „cognitive process‟ of 
essentialist thinking. 
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 Figure 2: Essentialism ratings for two fictitious ethnic groups (the Malfese and the 
Cabyn) under high and low NFC manipulations (i.e., time pressure versus feedback) 
(adapted from Roets & Van Hiel, 2011, Study 2).  
AUTHORITARIAN IDEOLOGY  
Motivated cognition not only affects the cognitive processes in social judgment, it 
also forms our ideological beliefs. A few years prior to Allport‟s work, Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) introduced the concept of the “Authoritarian 
Personality”. The links between these seminal works are plentiful (see Duckitt, 2005). In 
particular, when Allport described the prejudice-prone motivated cognitive style, he 
explicitly referred to authoritarian ideology in terms of craving for authorities that impose 
discipline and for defined hierarchies based on fixed groups, while Adorno and 
colleagues considered cognitive style variables such as intolerance of ambiguity and 
rigidity highly typical of authoritarianism.  
As a result, Allport‟s writings have often been interpreted in terms of 
authoritarianism (see Duckitt, 2005). However, whereas Allport‟s (1954) general 
cognitive style -like NFC- is in itself non-social and reflects a motivated way of thinking 
about anything, authoritarianism refers to an ideological attitude or a set of generalized 
social beliefs (Duckitt, 2001). Moreover, according to Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and 
Sulloway (2003), people adopt an ideological belief system such as authoritarianism 
precisely because it promises to satisfy their deeper psychological needs and motives, 
particularly their closure needs. Hence, general, non-social, motivated cognition can be 
considered the underlying basis of social attitudes such as authoritarianism. 
The assumption that NFC underlies authoritarian ideology is supported by 
multiple studies showing that not only dispositional but also situationally induced NFC 
leads to typical expressions of authoritarianism, such as the derogation of opinion 
deviants (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991), the formation of and preference for autocratic 
group structures with centralized authority (Pierro, Mannetti, De Grada, Livi, & 
Kruglanski, 2003), and an increased need for conformity (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 
1993).  
Putting together these individual pieces of evidence, various scholars have tested 
models in which social-ideological attitudes mediate the impact of NFC as a basic, 
motivated cognitive style on prejudice. Studies by Cunningham et al. (2004), Onraet et al. 
(2011), Roets and Van Hiel (2006), and Van Hiel et al. (2004) have demonstrated that a 
stronger endorsement of authoritarian views of society largely explains why people high 
in dispositional NFC show increased levels of blatant, subtle, and even implicit racism.  
These mediation effects were obtained for Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA, 
Altemeyer, 1981) and to a somewhat lesser degree for Social Dominance Orientation 
(SDO, Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), which capture Allport‟s (1954) 
description of authoritarianism in terms of craving for authorities imposing discipline, 
and preference for defined hierarchies, respectively. Recently, Roets et al. (in press) 
demonstrated that this mediation model including RWA and SDO also accounts for 
gender-based prejudice.  
 
SUMMARY 
Based on the extraordinary conceptual fit between Allport‟s prejudiced 
personality and NFC as well as the substantial body of recent empirical evidence on the 
role of NFC as a basis for race- and gender-based prejudice, we believe that NFC 
provides a most promising contemporary counterpart for the motivated cognitive style 
assumed by Allport to underlie „all‟ prejudice (although further corroboration for other 
forms of prejudice is appropriate). In fact, we claim that NFC is the only suitable 
counterpart given that other potentially relevant constructs not only lack a comprehensive 
conceptual fit with Allport‟s prejudiced personality, but, compared to NFC, also failed to 
yield strong and unique effects on prejudice, as has been demonstrated for Experiential 
Openness (Onraet et al., 2011), for other cognitive style variables such as Need for 
Cognition (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006), and  for Closure abilities (as opposed to needs; 
Roets & Van Hiel, 2006).  
In conclusion, recent research on NFC has finally provided long overdue support 
for Allport‟s thesis that a general motivated cognitive style underlies prejudice. At the 
same time, this body of research has identified the major mediating mechanisms for this 
relationship, as depicted in Figure 1.  
 
SHOULD WE BE FATALISTIC? 
The present review demonstrates that Allport‟s (1954) ideas of the prejudiced 
personality successfully predicted research findings over the following six decades.  
Moreover, Allport‟s work not only provided valuable insight into the prejudiced 
personality, it is also considered foundational for the intergroup contact hypothesis, 
which states that contact (under certain conditions) with outgroup members diminishes 
prejudice against this group. However, Allport assumed that intergroup contact cannot 
yield the anticipated positive results among people with this prejudice-prone cognitive 
style, exactly because of their rigid way of thinking. Yet, as Hodson (2011) has also 
pointed out, if interventions to reduce prejudice are ineffective for those people who are 
most prone to prejudice, then what is the point of such interventions?  
Fortunately, whereas a vast body of research has corroborated Allport‟s visionary 
ideas of the cognitive style underlying prejudice and the intergroup contact hypothesis 
(see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), his pessimistic prediction of the interplay between 
dispositional cognitive style and intergroup contact has recently been disproved. Various 
researchers (e.g., Hodson, 2008; Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009, 2011) have already presented 
evidence that intergroup contact reduces prejudice most among people who adhere to an 
authoritarian ideology (for an overview, see Hodson, 2011). However, in the context of 
Allport‟s writings, it is necessary to question whether these positive findings may reflect 
a more fundamental interplay between intergroup contact and basic, motivated cognitive 
style that underlies authoritarian ideology (see Figure 1). In particular, positive 
intergroup-contact increases familiarity with the out-group as well as the salience of 
positive information about this group. Since high-NFC individuals both desire familiarity 
and seize information that is most salient and easily-accessible (urgency) to form their 
attitudes, intergroup contact should be especially effective to reduce prejudice in these 
individuals. Recent work by Dhont, Roets and Van Hiel (2011) indicates that this is 
indeed the case. In a series of studies, these authors demonstrated that people high in 
dispositional NFC are more susceptible to the positive effects of intergroup contact on 
prejudice reduction than low scorers on NFC. Additionally, in a field experiment they 
found that Belgian high-school students, especially those high in NFC, who went on a 
one-week, intense-contact school trip to Morocco subsequently exhibited substantially 
less negative outgroup attitudes than a control group that was not involved in the program 
(see Figure 3).  
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Finally, Dhont et al. (2011) also demonstrated that the superior effect of 
intergroup contact in high-NFC individuals can be explained by the established notion 
that intergroup contact diminishes intergroup anxiety, which consequently reduces 
prejudice. Those who feel most averse and fearful toward the unfamiliar, ambiguous, and 
unpredictable, are likely to benefit the most from the anxiety-reducing effects of the 
salient information provided by positive intergroup contact.     
 
CONCLUSION 
Contemporary prejudice research converges in support of Allport‟s (1954) seminal thesis 
of a motivated cognitive style underlying prejudice and also provides insight into the 
mediating processes of this connection. However, in contrast to Allport‟s pessimistic 
view that prejudice-prone people are „incurable‟, prejudice in these individuals can be 
Figure 3. Effect of intergroup contact on negative attitudes toward the outgroup under 
high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) dispositional NFC (adapted from Dhont, Roets, & Van 
Hiel, 2011, Study 3). 
overcome, not by seeking to change the underlying cognitive style, but by using its 
heightened susceptibility to the positive impact of intergroup contact.  
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